WHAT THE MAINGUY REPORT NEVER TOLD US:
THE TRADITION OF ‘MUTINY’ IN THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY BEFORE 1949

Very early in its deliberations, the Mainguy Commission (named for its chairman, Rear-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, Flag Officer Atlantic Coast) was able to discern no such conspiracy, but its published findings, famously remembered as The Mainguy Report, went on to observe “on other matters concerning” the RCN. For nearly 50 years this has remained the most incisive examination of a military institution to be undertaken in Canada, and it has been described as “a remarkable manifesto” and “a watershed in the Navy’s history.” It identified systemic problems such as the breakdown of the Divisional System of

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HMCS Crescent, one of three Canadian ships struck by ‘mutiny’ in March 1949.
personnel management, frequent changes in ships’manning and routines with inadequate explanations, a deterioration in the traditional relationship between officers and petty officers, and the absence of a distinguishing Canadian identity in the Navy. The commissioners laid special emphasis upon the failure in each of the affected ships to provide functioning Welfare Committees, as prescribed by naval regulations, to allow the airing and correction of petty grievances.\(^3\) They noted also an “artificial distance between officers and men,” with the clear implication that this was the result of Canadian midshipmen obtaining their early practical experience in the big ships of the Royal Navy.\(^4\)

For the past half-century, the Canadian Navy has lived in the shadow of this legacy – for better and for worse. To this day, all candidates passing through the Naval Officer’s Training Centre in Esquimalt undertake as part of their basic coursework an exploration of the findings, recommendations and conclusions of the Mainguy Commission. At the same time, the tendency to ascribe the Navy’s post-war morale problems to an uncaring, anglophilic officer corps has created an illusion of separation from those events. Study of the circumstances of The Mainguy Report, however, serves in several different ways to illustrate that, if the past is not hidden, it truly can be a distant mirror of the present. Renewed interest in the subjects of leadership, ethics and quality of life issues, moreover, brings to such study a continuing relevance, and in a fashion transcending the bounds of narrow service interests.

For all the attention devoted to The Mainguy Report, it has never been subjected to rigorous analysis. Even a cursory critical review reveals a number of inconsistencies. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to detail these, previous research by this author has demonstrated that the incidents of 1949 were precipitated by the implementation of a fundamental rank and trade group restructuring, itself initiated by the Navy to resolve a number of long-standing personnel problems.\(^5\) For a variety of reasons, not all of them admittedly yet resolved with complete satisfaction, The Mainguy Report failed to calculate this restructuring in its final presentation, despite much evidence as to its cause and effect.

The Mainguy Report was less than forthcoming on at least one other of its findings, one which was essential to the context in which the mutinous incidents transpired and have been remembered for the last half-century. In attempting to establish a unifying link amongst the incidents of 1949, the commissioners pointed to an incident in the cruiser HMCS Ontario in August 1947. That earlier event also had taken the form of a mess deck lock-in, and The Mainguy Report described it as having involved some fifty men who subsequently had been dispersed through the fleet to the ships which were struck in 1949. In a recent interview, one of the ratings who was a party to both the incident in Ontario in 1947 and the later one in Athabaskan in 1949, then-Ordinary Seaman Dick Berg, was quite emphatic that the men from Ontario were not the ringleaders in 1949, and that, moreover, the earlier incident had involved virtually the entire lower-deck complement, some 300 junior ratings.\(^6\) Subsequent research has led to the discovery that Ontario was not the only one of His Majesty’s Canadian Ships which encountered difficulties in 1947. Mutiny, even in its relatively benign Canadian guise of mess deck lock-ins, carries a stigma which encourages cover-up instead of...
Despite other anecdotal accounts of the Corvette Navy, that “Indiscipline was chronic, drunken captains, useless officers, mutinous crews were commonplace”, the breakdown of discipline was never epidemic in the wartime navy. Bob Caldwell relates these examples instead as symptoms of a developing Volunteer Reservist (VR) culture, and part of the process by which the infusion of large numbers of VRs transformed the RCN into a “people’s navy”. The official history of the RCN allows that “There were three episodes (of open disaffection aboard a Canadian warship) during the war,” but provides neither names nor cap-tallies. Tucker devotes less than one long paragraph to discussion of these incidents, which he describes as “sit-down strikes” and attributes simply to “the leadership abilities of ships’ officers.” Through the efforts of Michael Whitby, the details of the first and last of these are now known. The Tribal-class destroyer Iroquois was struck on 19 July 1943 upon returning from a Gibraltar convoy, when the captain (an older, pre-war officer with a harsh leadership style) cancelled leave until a distinguishing crest stolen from a German prisoner was returned. On 10 January 1945, when the crew of the corvette Rivière-du-Loup learned that the captain had taken ill and the Executive Officer (a Volunteer Reservist in whose professional competence they already had lost confidence) was designated to take the ship to sea, this prompted them to demand his removal. Less is known of Tucker’s middle incident, although it has been identified as being in the corvette Chebogue in July 1944.

Other incidents have been brought to light in the course of recent detailed research into the Canadian naval war experience. Caldwell describes one in the armed yacht HMCS Reindeer in late November 1942 in Sydney, Nova Scotia when the crew used the pretext of lack of shore leave to express their concern over the growing instability of their captain. More incidents were uncovered in the postwar correspondence of the Royal Naval Commodore(D) in Londonderry (Commodore G.W.G. “Shrimp” Simpson), specifically in a letter to one of the Mainguy commissioners (Louis Audette) after publication of the report (Simpson was one of the few voices to openly disagree with the tone of the report and its findings). The first incident described by Simpson was one of the few outbreaks to take place at sea. In January 1944, the destroyer Restigouche was on North Atlantic convoy duty, and commanded by the future captain of Crescent, then-Lieutenant David Groos. A group of seamen newly drafted onboard felt they had been unfairly accused of theft by the ship’s doctor and had threatened to cease work until given an apology. Simpson noted that “it had been a serious incident, but [the captain]... dealt with [it] promptly, firmly and correctly, showing good powers of leadership and knowledge of his men.” Simpson, like Tucker, did not identify any of his subjects by name, but it has been possible to collate two other incidents described by him as those in Chebogue and Rivière-du-Loup. His comment on the former was that it “was more serious... I cannot recall the reason except that it was not due to personalities but to routine. I also recall that the pretext was totally frivolous”; and on the latter that it was “more on the pattern of [those investigated by] the Mainguy inquiry.” The fourth incident described by Simpson had occurred when several sailors from a corvette, the identity of which it has not been possible to establish, beat up a British shore patrol and would not own up to it. Simpson ordered the ship to sail “some
days in advance of schedule” and advised the captain that “if there was any further nonsense the ship would not be allowed in Londonderry [again].”

The one other known instance of mass protest in the wartime RCN occurred in HMS Nabob, a Royal Navy escort carrier with a Fleet Air Arm squadron embarked and British Merchant Service personnel in the Engine Room, but otherwise manned by Canadians. Disparities between Canadian and British rates of pay and victualling scale (the RCN was better in both respects) precipitated first a brief lock-in and then a large number of desertions. The captain (H.N. Lay, a nephew of Prime Minister Mackenzie King) had reported the sub-standard living conditions to the Admiralty, and was able to use these incidents to advantage in extracting concessions.

By the end of the Second World War, therefore, there had evolved a distinct pattern to the massed expression of protest in the RCN. The lock-ins – or ‘sit-down strikes’ as Tucker styled them – were spontaneous displays, precipitated by some local event and undertaken with a view to attracting the attention of immediate superior officers to a problem the sailors believed was within the power of those superiors to correct. The precise cause for protest varied. Most commonly it was over working conditions, less frequently it was over issues of welfare specific to the ship (such as the food and pay in Nabob), and occasionally it was in reaction to the intertemperate actions of the captain. Only once was the sailors’ aim the removal of the Commanding Officer (and in Iroquois, the captain was clearly the problem), and on only one other occasion did the crew refuse to sail (and then because Rivière du Loup’s Executive Officer – the problem – was the Commanding Officer-designate). The well-established procedure in Canadian Naval Regulations for redress of individual complaints was for them to be passed up the chain of command through the Divisional system. These same regulations specifically prohibited collective protest, prescribing that anyone seeking redress “shall [do so] as an individual and not in combination with any other person.” Persons of any rank could submit “Suggestions for the Improvement of the Naval Service” directly to the Naval Secretary, although, as the commissioners observed, this procedure might be intimidating to an ordinary seaman and:

...In any event, for one man to complain of the food or of the conduct of an officer, or of some individual unfairness, could not be very well interpreted as a statement of general dissatisfaction. Many men therefore felt, however wrongly, that the only method likely to be successful was the illegal and mutinous procedure on which they ultimately decided.

Invariably, large numbers of a ship’s company had joined together to give voice to some collective complaint for which there was no other officially sanctioned form of expression. Importantly, their officers recognized the restrictions under which the men operated, and appear to have accepted the lock-in as a form of protest. If the men’s demands were at all reasonable (and they usually were), they were indeed acted upon, promptly and without recrimination. No member of the RCN was ever charged with mutiny. The only persons who appear to have earned any significant time in cells were the men from Rivière du Loup who had disobeyed sailing orders. Certainly, no one ever was awarded the punishment stipulated under the Kings Regulations and Orders for the Royal Canadian Navy (KRCNs) for mutiny – death by hanging.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the RCN was not plagued with outbreaks of mass protest for some
time, although the potential remained just below the surface. The premature end of the war – at least from the perspective of the Naval Staff – with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, totally confounded an easy transition to a new fleet structure. Caught between the imperatives of demobilization and the determination to establish a balanced peacetime force for the first time in the navy’s history, the RCN found itself in the unenviable position of having to contract and to expand – with, as the Mainguy Commission would later style it, “all the accompanying stresses and strains”25 – but with those stresses and strains compounded by the requirement to undertake both contraction and expansion at virtually the same time. From a wartime high of nearly 100,000 personnel, within a year of VE-Day, demobilization had reduced the RCN to fewer than 3,800 all ranks. These were hard-pressed to meet the commitments of a projected 10,000-man peacetime establishment.26

In trying to come to grips with its manning difficulties, NSHQ resorted at first to postponing the demobilization of certain trades beyond the planned end-date of February 1946.27 This was met by a rash of petitions direct from sailors to the Minister. One telegram, for “One Hundred Naval Firefighters...being kept in [their] unit against their will” told the Minister, “...we turn to you in desperation...”28 Other messages such as this threatened an outbreak in the RCN of the mutinous incidents beginning to appear at army and overseas RCAF bases. That no such incidents did occur in the Navy probably speaks more to the patience of Canadian seamen in being prepared to accept some discomfort through the demobilization process than to anything else. By the end of 1946, however, their patience had worn thin.

The first postwar ‘incident’ in a Canadian warship occurred in the destroyer HMCS Micmac on 5 December 1946. From it, Leading Seaman Albert Allan Elliott has the distinction of being the only Canadian sailor to be court-martialed for mutinous activity, on two counts that he “did endeavour to seduce a man from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty”, and a third count that he “did endeavour to seduce a man from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty”. He was summarily tried by his captain, Commander R.L. Hennessy, who found him guilty and sentenced him to 90 days detention. When the case was sent to NSHQ for review, however, it was determined that the offence in fact warranted a higher-level hearing, so on 17 January 1947 a Standing Court Martial was convened at Stadacona to hear the case. There was little difference as to the outcome: Elliott once again was found guilty and, although sentenced to twelve months in detention, on appeal this was reduced to three months.

If news of such stern action had a chilling effect on the appetite of Canadian sailors to act out any more lock-ins, it was only temporary. In attempting to assess the degree of discontent in the RCN at this time, it is necessary to be aware of the size of the Canadian fleet: through most of 1947, on each coast, there were in commission only two fleet destroyers and one major unit (the carrier on the Atlantic and a cruiser on the Pacific). There could be few secrets in a force that small. Due to a combination of poor record keeping and a natural reticence to commit admissions of trouble to paper, hard evidence of mass protest is difficult to uncover. However, anecdotal accounts of discontent abound. One particularly useful source is a survey conducted by the Executive Officer at Stadacona, Commander E.W. Finch-Noyes, in an attempt to get to the bottom of a rash of desertions plaguing the fleet at this same time (itself another symptom of mass discontent). The statement of one Ordinary Seaman who deserted from the Tribal-class destroyer Nootka reflects the mood of many in the fleet:

I know I wasn’t on the Nootka long enough to have any justifiable reason for deserting, but when the whole crew of a ship get together in the Mess Decks and talk about walking off there must be something radically wrong someplace... The Nootka never would have sailed from Halifax at the end of July if the men had been organized... The Nootka, it seems has the largest number of deserters, so some sort of an investigation is plainly needed, but there is such a gap between the Ordinary Seaman and the Authorities at Ottawa that we could do nothing but wait until someone in authority becomes curious and starts finding things out for themselves.31

The Gunner’s Yeoman at the time was Leading Seaman Max Reid (he was commissioned from the ranks in 1948 and retired in the rank of captain). He remembers the seething unrest in the ship, and “constant talk about holding a lock-in,” of which he was not a ringleader but, as Senior Hand of the Mess, was a willing participant. Although he had served in a cruiser and saw many of the same problems there, he attributes the greater indiscipline in the destroyers to two factors: “no professional regulating staff..., and Interim Force Personnel.”32 A cruiser, being established as a training ship, had a higher proportion of new entries and a much larger contingent of Gunnery Instructors (Chief Petty Officers of the Seaman branch) to ‘regulate’ discipline. Destroyers relied upon a greater degree of self-discipline among the ratings, but Reid recalls that “[the
Interim Force] program... managed to bring in many misfits and trouble-makers... [There were] a half-dozen in the ship [who] continually bucked the system but more severe was their influence on the junior ratings.”

It was this group who finally organized a lock-in for the afternoon of 16 July 1947. Men were gathering in the mess deck after lunch instead of falling in after “Out Pipes”, when a report was received that the other east coast destroyer, Micmac, had collided in fog with the SS Yarmouth County in the Halifax approaches. All previous thoughts were put aside as the crew of Nootka raised steam and sailed to the aid of their comrades.

Technically, no mutinous incident had occurred. But at almost precisely this same moment, the Executive Officer of Stadacona was raising concern in NSHQ with a separate report of “the wholesale [sic] withdrawal of candidates... for the Gunnery Instructor Course in the United Kingdom.”

The five individuals in question were all senior ratings from Stadacona. Each had their own reasons for declining the course, mostly involving the entirely legitimate compassionate concerns that overseas moves of their dependents had not been approved, even though the course was a year long, and the men did not wish any further lengthy separation from their families so soon after the war. Although submitted separately, there evidently had been some collusion in the preparation and submission of the withdrawal requests. Coming in the midst of all the desertions and other incidents in the fleet, the fact “that our best Seamen CPOs and POs are those concerned” with this latest whiff of mass protest caught the attention of the Naval Staff. It was pure happenstance that, at precisely the same moment, NSHQ was transmitting signal “CANGEN 54” to the fleet, ordering the establishment of Welfare Committees in all RCN ships and establishments.

Within days, “the subjects of recruiting generally, morale, the number of discharges, etc. were discussed informally” at a meeting of the Naval Staff, following which the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff “requested Staff Directors to outline on paper their proposals to rectify these same very serious situations... in order that... firm recommendations [might] be submitted to Naval Board.” Their deliberations were given further impetus when, on 22 August 1947, there came the report of an incident of mass insubordination in one of the crown jewels of the Canadian fleet, the cruiser Ontario.

In June 1947, Ontario had been brought out of reserve to replace Uganda as the New Entry training cruiser. Under the command of Captain Jimmy Hibbard, with Commander J.V. Brock as Executive Officer, a full ship’s company was drafted in, and the ship sailed on 20 August on a shakedown voyage in preparation for work-ups. The ship was at anchor in the fleet exercise area at Nanoose Bay (near Nanaimo), when “a number of junior ratings requested the leading hands of the messes to procure an interview with the Executive Officer.”

The recent NSHQ signals promulgating restrictions on early releases and ordering the establishment of Welfare Committees had animated much mess deck discussion over the previous weeks, and now the men had several items they wished to discuss, mostly with respect to the ship’s routine and the wearing of higher orders of uniform for work details. Somehow, each side misinterpreted the intentions of the other and, despite the greater ‘regulating’ presence in the cruiser, practically the entire complement of junior hands proceeded to their mess decks, locking the doors behind them. In the process, they added another demand to their list of grievances: removal of the Executive Officer.

Captain Hibbard reacted quickly. So that no technical state of mutiny would develop, instead of ordering “Out Pipes”, Hibbard at first addressed the ship’s company over the loud-speaker broadcast system. His remarks are not recorded, but he was sufficiently reassuring that when he eventually did order “Clear lower decks,” the men responded by falling in. Within days, Brock was transferred to another ship. That move was undertaken with the concurrence of the Flag Officer Pacific Coast, Admiral Mainguy, who two years later magnanimously would admit, “In retrospect the speed of his transfer, without a complete investigation, appears to have been neither completely wise nor completely fair.”

But, in the time honoured tradition of the RCN, the men had obtained redress of their grievance.

With the immediate problem resolved, the staffs in NSHQ could return to the more important task of dealing with the underlying issues. There is enough to the Morale and Service Conditions Study undertaken in the fall of 1947 to warrant a separate study.

For this article it is sufficient to accept that it accurately identified many of the underlying sources of discontent in the RCN, and that within months a great many of its recommendations were being actioned. The measure of its effectiveness is that exhaustive research could uncover not a single reference to any sort of incident in the Canadian fleet between that in HMCS Ontario in August 1947 and the three in February and March 1949 reported upon by Admiral Mainguy and his commissioners.

In a dozen recorded incidents in as many years, from 1936 to 1947, captains of Canadian warships became familiar with the fateful phrase, “The men won’t come out, sir!” There has never been any systematic attempt to trace the history of mass protest in the RCN, or to analyse over time its causes and effects. In this, Canadian naval scholars are not alone. There are no
studies examining the extent or nature of mass protest in either the US Navy or the Royal Navy during the Second World War, although it begs credulity that navies of such vast scale would not have suffered from it. 41 “Shrimp” Simpson, Commodore(D) at Londonderry, noted that his Command “was a strenuous one.... [D]uring my last six months, the Boards of Inquiry averaged four a week, the majority of which were to investigate a lack of discipline and recommend means to maintain it.” 42 That he recalls only four incidents involving Canadian ships, and that three of them fell outside this time frame, is a sobering reflection on the possible scale of the problem in the British fleet.

It also serves to put the scale of the problems in the Canadian fleet into some sort of context. Mutiny is a serious subject, and any occurrence should not be dismissed too lightly. Students of the Canadian naval war effort, however, should take note of the fact that the incidence of it in Canadian warships barely registered with Commodore(D) Londonderry, where for most of the war the number of Canadian warships in port rivalled the British. Moreover, none of the incidents involved the “the violent seizure of a ship from her officers on the high seas,” a display which, according to one naval historian, “may be said to belong to the Cecil B. de Mille school of history.” 43 Indeed, the author of that statement, in his defining social study of the Royal Navy, demonstrated that such incidents “were virtually unknown in the Navy.” Instead, in the form of lock-ins, “collective actions by whole ship’s companies... did happen, and happened quite frequently.” 44 He maintains that they performed a vital function in naval life:

When other methods failed, [this form of] mutiny provided a formal system of public protest to bring grievances to the notice of authority. It was a sort of safety-valve, harmless, indeed useful, so long as it was not abused. It was part of a system of social relations which provided an effective working compromise between the demands of necessity and humanity, a means of reconciling the Navy’s need of obedience and efficiency with the individual’s grievances. It was a means of safeguarding the essential stability of shipboard society, not of destroying it. 45

The tradition of mutiny in the Canadian Navy, as such, was very much in keeping with that of the service from which the RCN derived so much else of its heritage. How much of this particular aspect did Canadian sailors (and their officers) derive from direct experience serving in RN ships during the interwar years is hard to determine. Since the ‘people’s navy’ of the RCNVR and new postwar recruits seemed to grow into it quite naturally, more likely it was the product of a common inheritance of liberal democracy.
The Mainguy Report portrayed the incidents of 1949 as an aberration when they were nothing of the sort. This is not to say that officer-man relations were ideal, or that there was not a better way to resolve shipboard discontent than through mass disobedience. Welfare Committees and the Divisional system had existed long before 1949, although neither officers nor ratings of the pre-war (and even the wartime) navy had much inclination for such formalities, especially when there was an informal ‘safety valve’ which could produce the desired results. The Mainguy Report’s insistence upon their rigorous application may have been quite in keeping with the modern tendencies of postwar society, but to abruptly dissociate these from earlier practise – indeed, to deny the tradition of ‘mutiny’ in the RCN – served to misrepresent the context for the incidents of 1949. Without such an honest understanding, subsequent generations of naval officers and ratings have been left with a jaded view of their past, perhaps for no good reason. If there is a ‘lesson’ in this sad history, it is that, as the Canadian Forces embarks upon its own agenda of reform, we must do so in honest appreciation of all the pertinent factors.

NOTES


9. Interview, Vice-Admiral Ralph L. Hennessy, Ottawa, 25 February 1999. Neither was it restricted to the RCN. The inter-war experience of mass protest in the Royal Australian Navy has received more rigorous analysis, and while many of the pre-conditions in that fleet were different (especially the fact of the presence in the fleet of a high proportion of British officers), it is nonetheless instructive. See, Kathryn Spurling, “Life and Unrest in the Lower Deck of the RAN in the 1930s”, in the Report of the Australian National Naval Institute (January/March 1997), pp. 41-48.


18. NAC, Personnel Records Centre (PRC), D.W. Groos, Personal File, S206 [efficiency evaluation], 3 October 1944 [signed, Cmde G.W.G Simpson]; and, Simpson to Audette, 21 June 1950.


21. The Mainguy Report, pp. 27-29, reproduces the relevant sections of KRCNs, chapter 12.

22. Although KRCNs were not codified until 1945, their wartime antecedents were not significantly different in letter or intent. See ibid., p. 27, citing KRCN art. 12.21(1).

23. ibid., pp. 30.

24. Figures from Report[s] of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending 31 March [var.], 1945-47 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, [var.]).

25. NAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, Box 1457, file 4290-12, NSHQ signal “CANGEN 30” [ Firmer Substantiation of requests for Release], 122123/June/1947; and “CANGEN 54” [Welfare Committees], 281445Z/July/1947, op. cit.


29. Simpson to Audette, op. cit.


31. ibid., pp. 237-238.